Showing posts with label Corporate Governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corporate Governance. Show all posts

Monday, June 27, 2011

Well that was a fun dash in ipredict, but now the honeymoon is over

Recently the iPredict admin put this on their blog (https://www.ipredict.co.nz/app.php?do=blog)

  • $2.50 account set up fee
  • $2.50/month account fee
  • 0.35% trading fee (35 cents per $100 traded); 0% trading fee on Active Orders and bundle purchases.
  • No withdrawal fee.
We will be introducing a close account function with this change.

So alas, this has cut the bottom right out of the market, for small traders like me with sub-$100 amounts invested in different stocks.



I have big issues with this.....
- Most stocks take more than a month to mature
- If you gains are consistantly 30% (@$100 invested) you will end up with negative returns
- With no-one taking the "cheap risks" the only players left will be the sharks, completely red water market but with no prey.
- ipredict was a tool to define what the people think, now it is what the elitist think.

I believe you will find this is the beginning of the end of ipredict. No doubt there will be somebody out there that is thinking - "Hey now is the perfect time to create a competitor". If so you are correct, not only are you correct - but I have $1000 to invest in your company and become a shareholder. I will even help you get it off the ground. Drop me an email farrst@gmail.com if you wish to start this venture.


www.farrst.blogspot.com

Monday, April 11, 2011

Its bad when you start the day with - "Well I can't be fucked, I busy enough already"

Sorry guys, I don't usually do this.......but I am tired. I am cranky......I NEED TO VENT!!!!

Its bad when you start the day with - "Well I can't be fucked, I busy enough already"
But this is the cold, hard truth that I am facing.
Its 10:30pm, I have a list of things to do before tomorrow.......but I can't be fucked.
I worked dumb hours last week. Because I have to do a big project.......and to get to site is 4 hours drive. So that basically means that I am driving 1 day of the week. Working another 5. My weekends are chewed up with either Uni tests or looking at houses/cars for wife......or if I am lucky cleaning. Then preparing for the next day of craziness......




This just goes round and round. I don't get stuff all time to spend with my future son or my wife for the matter. Whom needs all the help she can get at this point. The dumb hours I am working are just going to get worse this week as not only do I have to do all the dumb stuff I did last week......but I also I need to chew up what is left of my weekend by also setting up for a training course next week. Why the weekend.......BECAUSE I AM TOO BUSY THIS WEEK AND NEXT WEEK TO DO IT!!!!
This only gets worse when I look at how I am appreciated. Yep I worked it out. After tax, my last bonus and pay rise worked out to a 0.6% per annum increase over what was getting paid from day one........18 months ago. To make matters worse, this is still 20% lower than what I was being paid 2 years ago.

This image pretty much summed up how I felt like while I am tapping away at the keyboard right now.




Nuff said really.
MBA done in June
Baby boy due June
Big project finished in June

June sounds like an interesting month, need to line a few things up I think......and have a break for once.

Right that felt better. See I needed to vent. Now back to the things I was suppose to do tonight.......fuck it, I'm off to bed.



www.farrst.blogspot.com

Saturday, March 19, 2011

Atlast Shrugged part 1......IN MOVIE FORM

This has to be one of my all time favorite books. EVERY HARD WORKER SHOULD READ IT.



Before all of you ask me, "Who is John Galt?" - he is the creator of the engine.
 
Engine of what you ask? Now that would be telling.......
http://www.atlasshruggedpart1.com
www.farrst.blogspot.com

Saturday, November 28, 2009

Corporate Governance - NZ Farming Systems Uraguay

Big Bully Approach to Farming outside New Zealand

What are the Corporate Governance Issues involved with NZFSU, and how do they compare with the principals and rules of Corporate Governance and Responsibility?

Issue 1)

Principle: Balance of Board (SEC, 2004)

Issue: The Directors that has been elected, was put in place via biased means. (Gaynor, 4/11/2009)

Why a problem?
Because the old board was re-instated, the existing problems were not addressed and no improvements will be made. It also means that the board of Directors will only change when the directors step down. It could mean that the Directors are being setup as puppets for the board. This directly ties to other issues addressed below.


Issue 2)

Principles: Effectiveness of the Board, Ethics of Directors, Quality and Independence of Auditing and Checking of Processors to Manage Risk (SEC, 2004)

Issue: The board has not pursued a balance between NZFSU and PGG Wrightson (Gaynor, 27/10/2009). Allowing for miss-management of funds between the two. From my perspective this was covered with 'creative accounting'. However, this was eventually discovered during an NZX audit where "Fudge this" (Young, 2009) was left on the copy of the books.

Why a problem?
Due to the board not pursuing irregularities in accounts. This also led to a large public outcry when colloquial terms were used in accounts presented to the NZX (Young, 2009), scaring away new investors from NZFSU.
The recovery of this situation was bad. Chairman Keith Smith was quoted for saying:

“The board has investigated the matter and is satisfied that it is an isolated incident that will not occur again with appropriate checks and controls now in place. Having said that we certainly regret the negative impact the matter caused.” (Smith, 2009)

Clearly stating that he only felt bad for the negative impact it caused externally. And that the incident would not occur due to internal controls not releasing similar information. Very trivial for an issue which involves cash-flow and 'depreciation' according to the reply to the NZX (Young, 2009).
This has accumulated a massive dilution of shares combined with a debt larger than PGG Wrightson. This is discussed later in the article.
Issues 3)
Principles: Boards relationship with Shareholders and Stakeholders

Issue: Purchasing of assets is not being disclosed to the share or stakeholders. (Gaynor, 27/11/09)

Why a problem?
By not disclosing the assets history or nature to their shareholders, investors do not know where the money is going. Land is being purchased via internal channels, with no history of rateable value (Gaynor, 27/11/09) - which due to the nature of the business cannot be considered internal trading, but does leave suspicions on many investors.
This combined with a complete watering down of shares due to reinvestment overseas has left shareholders concerns about what revenues are being made. (Baldwin, 2009)
Stakeholders are also cautious. With slight outrage that NZFSU are based purely in Uruguay, where apparent parent group PGG Wrightson (and their parent PGC), are suppose to be New Zealand companies for the New Zealand farming community.

However this is only the basics of what NZFSU and PGG, under the eyes of the Corporate Governance Principles.
Later we will address if they have Qualitative Governance at all.
As an Investor, what do I think is wrong with the boards and the governance of PGGW and NZFSU?

I think the reasoning behind NZFSU existing has not been fully disclosed to investors (of either PGGW or NZFSU).

Questions have been raised about how NZFSU has allocated its resources. Or what its purpose is. Consistently there have been Management and Performance fee's exchanged between the two firms (Gaynor, 27/10/2009). This with the included costs of purchasing lands between the two firms - I would question who the stakeholders are of the NZFSU.

This issue has been buried consistently with the lack of a new board of Directors. Leaving all new eyes off the existing books and new minds off the company direction. To quote Gaynor (4/11/2009):

"The old boys’ network is firmly in control in New Zealand, even though its performance has left a lot to be desired."

This is reinforced by the NZFSU website which states:

"At each annual meeting one third of the Directors must retire. The Directors who retire are eligible for re-election." and "John Suffield Parker retired and offered himself for re-election. Graeme Henry Wong retired and offered himself for election having been previously appointed by the Board of Directors subsequent to the 2008 Annual Shareholders Meeting. Each was elected by separate motions passed by ordinary resolution of shareholders." (*, 2009)

This means that a significant percentage of shareholding would be required to sway this downward spiral the company is on. It is worth noting also that PGG Wrightson's board members and NZFSU are one and the same - and not even further investment by PGC and Agria could affect the electing of new members in to PGG Wrightson's. (Baldwin, 11/2009)

When prospecting investors have looked into NZFSU, they have found that the operations do not have very sound operations. Duncan McGregor warned investors with this comment:

"What I am saying is if I buy a commercial building to rent out in NZ I can expect a return on capital between 6% to 8% in rent plus a capital gain when I sell. If I buy a farm in any country in this world...I can only expect a 3pc return on capital if I run it myself plus a capital gain when I sell.
To place managers in and run it like a company is a fool’s investment.
That’s only my opinion having been around farms in quite a few different countries. The investors coming into this will be city people I can’t see any practical farmers investing in this." (2007)

So with a board that can't be fixed, operations that are not transparent, expenses that don't add up, stakeholders being ignored and operations that don't make sense - Investment would be the last thing on my mind. The closest thing that comes to mind is a pyramid scheme.
How has the board met and failed to meet its obligations to stakeholders?

Who is the stakeholder?

NZFSU on its own is business set to fail.
- It does not have any links back to New Zealand with the exception of the board (who are also the board of PGGW).
- It is apply New Zealand market dynamics to an international product
- The product NZFSU produces is in direct competition with PGGW's stakeholders
- There is no rational reason to purchase land in Uruguay for a New Zealand based company.
- Re-investment cannot be counted as income.

This leaves the stakeholders as:
- PGG Wrightson’s (customer / owner ???!!!)
- Uruguay farming (customer / supplier)
- The Board (owners)
- Shareholders (owners)

Note that the New Zealand farming community, New Zealand public and New Zealand Government is not a stakeholder in NZFSU.

Stated on NZFSU is nothing about its obligations to the stakeholders. Only the Shareholders are mentioned.
Currently NZFSU has delivered its obligations to PGG Wrightson’s and the Board. It is yet to deliver its potential obligations to the shareholders - expected time for this is 2011. (Baldwin, 8/2009)

2011 is expected to be the first year when NZFSU's figures of income and expenses will break even. However you could question whether this will ever occur, with the ever-increasing annual Management and Performance Fee's being paid to PGG Wrightson. (Gaynor, 27/10/2009).
What obligations do I think the directors have, to ensure that they investors are protected?

Directors, in theory should be able to follow the basic rules of Quantitative Governance. Mervyn King's 8 questions are an easy assessment of Quantitative Governance:

Is there Conflict?
Yes there is conflict.
As stated previously, the board of NZFSU have no degrees of separation between them and the board of PGGW. This has prevented issues to be properly addressed, and has created a loop of money out of investors pockets, into NZFSU, out of NZFSU into PGGW. There also is a conflict in terms of PGGW's stakeholders (NZ Farming) and their relationship with NZFSU who is effectively a competitor to NZ Farming.

Do the Directors have all the facts to make a decision?
Yes they do. They have an excess of information which has given them a competitive advantage to go against the NZ Farming industry (direct competitor).
They have more information than most of their competitors due to operating in 3 different countries. This is due the fact that there are close direct ties between NZFSU, PGGW, PGC and Agria. They are aware of how much shares are required for each step - and they are dictating expenses from NZFSU to PGGW accordingly.

Is this a rational business decision based on all the facts?
Rational - yes, however the ethics could be questions.
With NZFSU, PGGW has a legal money laundering operation. If excess funds are required - they can put a request for shares in NZFSU onto the market - then claim the funds as an expense on NZFSU's accounts. (Gaynor, 10/2009) Likewise if they require to push money out of the PGGW accounts they invest into NZFSU through over-inflated land (which they are not required to declare the history).
However separate PGGW from NZFSU, and the decision to move with NZFSU would not just be irrational, it would be suicidal.

Is the decision in the best interest of the company?
Yes for PGGW, No for NZFSU.
PGGW as stated above has created a legal money laundering process with NZFSU. This however does mean that NZFSU will only exist until either a law makes it illegal - or a principle makes the shareholders aware of the situation they have invested in. Most likely the latter - when NZFSU has to show the true value of the assets on its books.

Is they communication to the stakeholders transparent?
No for both NZFSU and PGGW.
Only expenses are accounted for with NZFSU - and there is no proof what they have proposed with their mission statement and goals is even achievable.

Is the company acting in a socially responsible manner?
No for both
By not disclosing full transparency. They have taken shareholders money and shown no true return for it. This dishonesty towards shareholders is echoed to the stakeholders of PGGW who are now in competition with NZFSU.
Are the directors acting as good stewards of the company's assets?
PGGW - Yes, NZFSU - No
NZFSU is buying assets at whatever price the directors dictate. This is also noticeable in the annual fees NZFSU has in association with PGGW. Shareholders money is being spent not invested.

Would the board be embarrassed if its decision and the process employed in arriving at the decision appeared on the front of the national newspaper?
Yes they would.
This has happened to them before (Smith, 2009). And will continue to happen so long as the system currently in place are allowed to continue. Eventually you can expect that NZFSU will collapse - taking PGGW and Uruguay farming with it.

What options are open to them to meet these obligations?

They need to make NZFSU a completely separate company, if they do not separate it from PGGW and PGC – the collapse NZFSU could backfire on both.

Complete foreign ownership would be the best solution.
What changes are required from the regulators to prevent this happening again?

This is a situation where regulation may not have been the issue. Due diligence has been lost.
Shareholders were willing to invest in a company that promised high returns, without looking at the situation, background or even the parent group.

A warning flag should have been raised at the first signs of the start up. It was started by a director of PGG Wrightson's. It was assumed that because he was working with PGG Wrightson's at the same time of NZFSU - that no conflict would occur. Yet no one considered the concept of who the stakeholders of NZFSU would be, and if their needs would conflict with the stakeholders of PGGW.

The only way they can prevent this is more transparency with reports to the NZX, which hopefully would aid investors from making unwise investments. A similar approach is being trialled in the US.

References:
SEC, (2004),.CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES - A Handbook for Directors, Executives, and Advisers
Securities Commission (New Zealand)

Gaynor, B (2009),. Old Boys Club remains closed to new entrants
http://www.briangaynor.co.nz/blog/2009/11/4/old-boys-club-remains-closed-to-new-entrants.html
(last viewed 4/11/2009)
Gaynor, B (2009),. PGG Wrightson bills NZ Farming Systems Uruguay for US$62M
http://www.briangaynor.co.nz/blog/2009/10/27/pgg-wrightson-bills-nz-farming-systems-uruguay-for-us62-mill.html
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

Young, C, Daly, J (2009),. NZ Farming Systems Uruguay Ltd – Annual Financial Statement ("Fudge This")
NZX / NZFSU
http://www.nzx.com/markets/NZSX/NZS/announcements/2806777/NZ-Farming-Systems-Uruguay-Ltd-Annual-Financial-Statement
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

Smith, R (2009),. NZFSU gets pass fudge comment
National Business Review - Thursday October 15 2009 - 03:25pm
http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/nzfsu-gets-pass-fudge-comment-113321
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

Baldwin, L (2009),. NZFSU targets 2011 breakeven
National Business Review - Wednesday August 26 2009 - 04:50pm
http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/nz-farming-systems-uruguay-targets-2011-breakeven-109122
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

Baldwin, L (2009),. Chinese Balance - Shift in Power at PGG Wrightsons
National Business Review - Friday November 20 2009 - 02:52pm
http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/chinese-shift-balance-power-pgg-wrightson-115247
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

* (2009) New Zealand Farming Systems Website
http://www.nzfsu.co.nz/index.pasp
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

History of PGG Wrightson
http://www.pggwrightson.co.nz/assets/about%20wrightson/history/History%20Of%20PGG%20Wrightson.pdf
(last viewed 23/11/2009)


McGregor, D,. (2007) - nz farming systems Uruguay
Sharetrader Forums
http://www.sharetrader.co.nz/showthread.php?s=ec40f7bd2b131f0d0fad60962ed199b0&t=4650
(last viewed 23/11/2009)

Other Resources (read but not quoted or paraphrased):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_governance
http://www.kpmg.com/aci/gov.asp
http://shareinvestornz.blogspot.com/
http://www.iod.org.nz/
http://www.briangaynor.co.nz/
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/blogs/stirring-the-pot/

www.farrst.blogspot.com

New Zealand Corporate Governance Regulations: Running on International tides of change?

New Zealand Corporate Governance Regulations: Running on International tides of change?
Due to the core fundamentals of Corporate Governance, it is something that cannot be ruled and regulated easily. The fact that not only does it tie investors to operations to accounting – it does so while trying to negotiate a “General set of ideas” for all individuals involved.
With that in mind, the world has split 2 ways on how Corporate Governance should be enforced. In the America’s – a set of rules are laid out, should you exceed the boundary of the rule, you are found to be using incorrect Corporate Governance. The black and white are set by the rules – the grey, unknown, unexploited area is something that the rules do not cover.
New Zealand (and other European countries), operate under a set of Corporate Governance Principals (SEC, 2004). These principals are broken down under the following headings:
a) Ethics of Directors
b) Balance of the Board
c) Effectiveness of the Board
d) Integrity and Timeliness of Disclosures to the Board
e) Fair, Transparent and Reasonable pay to Directors
f) Checking of Processors to Manage Risk
g) Quality and Independence of Auditing
h) Boards relationship to shareholders
i) Boards relationship to stakeholders
These are broken down to a more refined set of Guidelines. The reason why the principals fit well with Business is due to the fact that the same countries that use principal based accounting, also use principal based Corporate Governance. This however also means that the accountants are also heavily involved in the Corporate Governance.
So if we have different ways of conforming to Corporate Governance, how was it that a series of crashes overseas? Well apart from the obvious that they are linked markets with shared investments – when the US market had large players display poor corporate governance, all corporate entities were then considered “evil”.
When the books of a few of these entities were researched, some less than pleasing results occurred. While in the US, companies were getting away with it due to being outside the rules; in New Zealand (and other European countries) it was where the line was not drawn where exceptions were made.
If you look at the New Zealand Principals of Corporate Governance (SEC, 2004), you will notice that the 9 principals are actually quite specific. The board must be balanced, well informed and able to maintain a relationship with the board. The Directors must have a relationship with the board, and make ethical decisions. But it is because of this – which large voids appear.
What happens if the board are not well informed, who’s disclose is it at?
Where are the Directors business related decisions? Are they purely based on ethics and board?
Are the employees stakeholders? If so how is their relationship to the board? Is it only through the director?
Why don’t the Risk Management Audits have independent?
What are good ethics? What cultural backgrounds are they based?
Who is monitoring whom? Are they biased?
How quickly can the board react if they find something out of place?
Does the old boy’s club of Boards still exist? (Gaynor, B, 2009)
By not setting a clearly defined rule, the principals can be interpreted in different ways. Even the Handbook for Directors, Executives, and Advisers (SEC, 2004) states that it is:

“It is intended as a reference for directors, executives and advisers, as they decide how best to apply the Principles to their particular entity. The nine Principles and their accompanying guidelines are included together with the Commission’s view on the particular area of corporate governance.”

So how to you enforce principals, when you state they are up for miss-interpretation? Well the system is not set in place to “go out and get people” – It’s actually set in place so that individuals exceed the recommendations. Reading the individual guidelines show evidence of this, with words such as “should” rather than “required”. It is the diligence of the board and directors that “should” changes to “must” and “required”.

However one could argue, how do you punish someone that “should” have done something, but failed to recognize it? If a formal charter is not established – can you really hold the board accountable?

The Principals rely heavily on Due Diligence, and Common Sense (PWC, 2003) – which are no longer punishable by the law (corporate or civilian). So while there are “winners” who will exceed the S.E.C.’s recommendations, there will also be losers who may choose to ignore them.

So why are there still holes in Corporate Governance? Can this be fixed?
As stated earlier, Corporate Governance is not an easy thing to regulate. Whenever an issue arises – this hole in the theory is either covered up or a “safety net” is placed underneath to try and catch it next time.
Most acts amendments or “safety net” acts are based on the accounting side of Corporate Governance. This does not identify with the core fundamental flaw that is the moral obligation of the direction of the company. Even the famed reform act, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (see “Other Resources” in rear) – which was written up to protect investors, can only protect them from an accounting perspective. Which, given the current financial situation is obviously not sufficient.
The reason for this being, that most situational issues regarding poor Corporate Governance are only formally recorded as accounting errors. Emails, notes, conversations and other recordings of poor governance are very difficult to follow and monitor.

While the accounting processors can monitor the outbreak of a Corporate Governance failure, in most situations when it has reached that stage, the problem is already deep rooted. Meaning the only acts that can be made are that of Retribution by holding the Directors (and on occasion the board) responsible. It has only fallen on the moral obligations on the directors and the board during recent times, to decide whether to declare issues before they become problems. However, in most of these situations – doing this also does not put you in a good light with the stakeholders or shareholders, as it usually means the company will require entering a form of receivership.

The current proposed solutions out there involve reform and compliance to new policy. Two strong contenders are Basel II (a review of Basel I – Risk Reserve) and Solvency II (a review of Solvency I – Company operations vs. Solvency)

The problem with Basel II is very simple; how do you measure risk? Currently the only way this is done – is purely on a financial basis. If I do this, and it goes wrong, I stand to lose “X” dollars....

This then is covered by a banking operation and reserve accounts. However is this not just another safety net which protects the stupid? What happens to those that fail to use good operational risk management? Well this is covered by Solvency II – which (from an insurance firm’s perspective) checks to see if the safety nets can actually be paid in full.

But wasn’t this already in place before? Yes, yes it was. Remember principals 6 and 7? To calculate, manage and audit risk. This has been a corporate governance principal in NZ for many years.
It also in the US rules based system. But it also relied on the principal of “disclosure”. If you did not disclose the problem – you did not have to address. This is where the rules failed.

So have we solved any problems by introducing Basel II and Solvency II? Well actually all we have done is put more specifics, and made the topic a bit less broad. But it does not solve the issue of disclosing the true figures of risk.

The USA is also tightening policy outside of business. With investors’ acts, they hope to prevent people from making unwise investment. Taking the supply of bad investment away from Poor Corporate Governance. (Willkie, Farr, Gallagher, 2009)

How will this reform process in the USA and Europe feed down to New Zealand?

Due to New Zealand being tucked away from the world, policies usually are not enforced here immediately. However they will be put in place overseas – so international trading companies will have to comply, along with multinational companies with branches in New Zealand.

This in turn will slowly dictate how the market will operate. As a large percentage of the big companies in New Zealand fall into the 2 categories described below. First people will be “exceeding” the “advice” of the current principals by apply to the new system (to continue business), and then we may have our own reform to change the standards to what we are already doing in New Zealand.

This however still will not fix all the problems, unless the individuals are continuously driven to exceed the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Principals. Likewise can be said about the USA and applying above the required for the rules based system.

References:
Willkie, Farr, Gallagher, (2009),. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM FOR NON-U.S. FUND MANAGERS
www.willkie.com

SEC, (2004),.CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES - A Handbook for Directors, Executives, and Advisers
Securities Commission (New Zealand)

Gaynor, B (2009),. Old Boys Club remains closed to new entrants
http://www.briangaynor.co.nz/blog/2009/11/4/old-boys-club-remains-closed-to-new-entrants.html
(last viewed 4/11/2009)

PWC (2003),. Audit Committees - Good practices for meeting market expectations (2nd ed)
PWC

Other Resources (read but not quoted or paraphrased):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes-Oxley_Act
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_governance
http://www.kpmg.com/aci/gov.asp
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=KxhCd7rf0ltYlNwTrVFGz95L0QQLgVGvNkFp3wpZpxK10QTpvPhL!-950397748!568259201?docId=5008765482
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_risk_management
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solvency_II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_governance
http://shareinvestornz.blogspot.com/
http://www.iod.org.nz/
http://www.briangaynor.co.nz/
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/blogs/stirring-the-pot/
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14738392
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14756903
http://search.ft.com/search?queryText=corporate+governance&ftsearchType=type_news
http://books.google.co.nz/books?id=Vrm4b4sLzz8C&pg=PA170&lpg=PA170&dq=regulatory+review+of+US+corporate+governance&source=bl&ots=o5IBshaYLK&sig=wYHOlbRwjWtfnv2LFsy5bk2Z0UI&hl=en&ei=s6TxSo-vBo_ssQOUxbX4AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CBQQ6AEwAjgU#v=onepage&q=regulatory%20review%20of%20US%20corporate%20governance&f=false


www.farrst.blogspot.com